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INVASION OF PRIVACY IN TEXAS: PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE OF EMBARRASSING
PRIVATE FACTS
INTRODUCTION

Although invasion of privacy tort law has existed for more than a
century in the United States,1 in Texas, this area of the law is in its
infancy, tracing back only a quarter century.2 The purpose of this
comment is three-fold: (1) to illustrate the origins of the four modern
torts constituting invasion of privacy; (2) to examine public disclosure
of embarrassing private facts ("private-facts tort"); and (3) to argue
for revising the Texas private-facts tort in order to resolve its current
conflict with the rights to free speech and free press. This discussion
centers on recent mass media cases that conflict with the First Amendment.' Although the mass media does not have legal rights superior
to any person, partnership, or corporation, this comment assumes protecting mass media interests serves to safeguard all First Amendment
interests.
Part I of this comment traces the origins of invasion of privacy in
the United States and explores available defenses. Part II traces invasion of privacy in Texas with specific emphasis on the private-facts
tort. Part III offers suggestions to Texas courts regarding invasion of
privacy as it continues to evolve in Texas.
I.

ORIGINS OF INVASION OF PRIVACY

Today's invasion of privacy law arises principally from a line of law
review articles, beginning with the influential 1890 study by law partners Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren.4 Brandeis and Warren
wrote:
1. See generally

JOHN D. ZELEZNY, COMMUNICATIONS LAW: LIBERTIES, REAND THE MODERN MEDIA 158 (1993) (discussing inception of problems in
the media); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 196 (1890).
2. Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858. 861 (Tex. 1973) (holding invasion of privacy is a legal injury).
3. The First Amendment provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196. Today, there are four separate,
distinct torts: (1) commercial appropriation of name or likeness; (2) public disclosure
of embarrassing private facts; (3) placing an individual in a false-light; and (4) intrusion upon physical seclusion. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389
(1960). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E (1977).
STRAINTS,

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/TWLR.V2.I2.8
Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

1

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 2 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 9

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency .... The intensity and complexity of life,

attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary
some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence
of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude
and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and5 distress, far greater than
could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.
It should be noted the United States did not inherit a common law
privacy tort from England.6 Furthermore, the U.S. Constitution does
not specifically recognize the right of individual privacy, and early legislatures did not provide one.7 But by the early 1900's, times were
radically changing.' "Perhaps most important was the advent of commercial mass media that were highly competitive and pervasive. Extremely private matters could be made quite public overnight. And
the media seemed increasingly inclined to do just that."9
Today, there are four invasion of privacy torts recognized either by
statute or common law: commercial appropriation, false light, intrusion, and public disclosure of embarrassing private facts. 10 In some
instances, however, courts have rejected one or more of Professor
Prosser's four categories. 1 Although some scholars collectively treat
the four types of invasion of privacy torts as a single legal right to be
left alone," it is nevertheless constructive to consider the four categories as separate, distinct torts. 3
A.

Commercial Appropriation

Commercial appropriationis the oldest and perhaps most settled of
the four modern torts, beginning with the case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co. 4 In 1902, Franklin Mills Flour commercially appropriated Abigail Roberson's image for its advertising posters.
Twenty-five thousand lithographic prints of her image appeared in saloons, stores, and other public places both locally and nationally.
Roberson sued for invasion of privacy commercial exploitation and
5. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
6. See ZELEZNY, supra note 1, at 158.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Prosser, supra note 4.

11. See Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tex. 1994) (rejecting recogni-

tion of false-light invasion of privacy); Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co.,
312 S.E.2d 405, 410 (N.C. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984) (rejecting false-light
invasion of privacy).
12. See, e.g.,

THOMAS

M.

COOLEY,

LAW OF

TORTS

29 (1993).

13. See Prosser, supra note 4.
14. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
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ultimately lost.' 5 The Roberson court, unpersuaded that such a legal
right existed, was concerned with the recognition of such a tort and its
possible impact on freedom of speech and freedom of press. 16 Consequently, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the intermediate
court, denying Roberson's recovery because "the so-called 'right of
'
privacy' has not as yet found an abiding place in our jurisprudence."17
The Roberson decision created tremendous public controversy. As
a result, New York passed its first privacy law in 1903, prohibiting the
use of an individual's name or likeness for trade or advertising purposes without the person's consent. 18 Shortly thereafter, following
New York's lead, Georgia courts took action recognizing a common
law right of privacy in 1905. In Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 19 the Georgia Supreme Court considered the unauthorized
use of an individual's photograph in a life insurance advertisement.
20
Persuaded by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis' law review article
and Justice Gray's dissent in Roberson,2 1 the Pavesich court enthusiastically recognized a legal right to privacy:
So thoroughly satisfied are we that the law recognizes, within
proper limits, as a legal right, the right of privacy, and that the publication of one's picture without his consent by another as an advertisement, for the mere purpose of increasing the profits and gains of
the advertiser, is an invasion of this right, that we venture to predict
that the day will come that the American bar will marvel that a
contrarY2 2view was ever entertained by judges of eminence and ability ....

Since Pavesich, other courts have awarded damages to private citizens for shame, humiliation, and mental distress resulting from the
unauthorized commercial exploitation of their identities. 23 Consequently, celebrities and public figures have recovered for commercial
appropriation of their likenesses.24 The rationale behind celebrity recovery is that a celebrity's right to publicity is essentially a property
right.25 In these circumstances, the plaintiff's primary concern is not
15. Id.
16. Id. at 444, 447.

17. Id. at 447.
18. See DON R. PEMBER,

MASS MEDIA LAW

213 (6th ed. 1993).

19. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905) (holding likeness

to be a property right).

20. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1.
21. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 448.

22. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 80-81.

23. See, e.g., Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488, 500 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990).
24. See, e.g., Maples v. National Enquirer, 763 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Ga. 1990);
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
25. KENT R. MIDDLETON
NICATION 216 (2d ed. 1991).

& BILL F. CHAMBERLIN, THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUMiddleton and Chamberlin note celebrities who make

their living from public performances are accustomed to public exposure and thus
suffer commercial loss. Id. at 216.
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his appearance in the advertisement, but rather the lack of monetary
compensation for the use of his image or likeness. Nevertheless, damages are often awarded for the consequential embarrassment or
shame suffered from the unauthorized publicity. It is this element of
mental distress which relates commercial appropriation to the other
three torts and to the general2 6invasion of privacy abhorred by Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis.
B.

False-Light

False-light is the public dissemination of highly offensive information about a person with knowledge or reckless disregard of the
truth.27 False-light cases typically are mass media invasions and fall
into three categories: distortion, embellishment, and fictionalization.
Distortionresults either from the false impression created when information or photography is used out of context or when relevant information is omitted. In Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co.,28 a court
considered whether the photographic distortion of a married couple
constituted commission of the false-light tort when the husband was
pictured with his arm around his wife, touching his cheek to her face.
In Gill, the picture was taken without the couple's knowledge or consent. Later, Ladies Home Journal published the photograph to illustrate a story regarding love. The caption read, "Publicized as
glamorous, desirable, 'love at first sight' is a bad risk."2 9 The compan-

ion story stated love at first sight is the wrong kind of love because it is
based on "100% sex [sic] attraction" instead of affection and respect.3"
Consequently, the California Supreme Court held, "It is not unreasonable to believe such would be seriously humiliating and disturbing to
plaintiffs' sensibilities.., especially when we consider it deals with the
intimate and private relationship between the opposite sexes and
marriage."31

Embellishment results from false information being added to a journalistic account. In Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.,32 an Ohio
newspaper reporter wrote a follow-up news story concerning the
plight of the widow and family of Melvin Cantrell, who died in an
accident.33 In Cantrell,a reporter visited the family's home and noted
the abject poverty of the family. In his follow-up story, the reporter
described how "Margaret Cantrell will talk neither about what happened nor about how they are doing. She wears the same mask of
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 652C; Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 652E.
28. 239 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1952).
29. Id. at 632.
30. Id.

31. Id. at 635.

32. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
33. Id. at 247.
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non-expression she wore at the funeral."3 Margaret Cantrell, however, was not at home when the reporter visited, nor had she ever
even met him.35 Thus, the United States Supreme Court, in upholding
the jury award for the plaintiff, held knowingly or recklessly publishing falsehoods is sufficient to support a jury finding against a
reporter.36

Fictionalization occurs when fictional elements are attributed to
real persons or events. In Strickler v. NBC,37 for instance, a plaintiff
claimed he was harmed by the defendant's portrayal of him in a television docudrama.38 The plaintiff, a commander on active duty with the
U.S. Navy, was a passenger on a commercial flight forced to make an
emergency landing. 39 The defendant portrayed the plaintiff as smoking cigarettes, being out of uniform, and engaging in the "highly personal and private act of praying" while on active duty." According to
the plaintiff, these were fictional elements attributed to him which
caused him "humiliation, embarrassment and great mental pain and
suffering."'" At trial, the defendant asserted the offensiveness of such
depictions is a question of law for the court to determine."2 The federal district court disagreed, however, and held the offensiveness of
any such depictions is a question of fact, thus overruling the defendant's motion to dismiss. a3

C. Intrusion
The modern intrusion tort is defined as the intentional invasion into
a person's physical seclusion or private affairs in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person."a Intrusion can be traced back to
eavesdropping, which was considered a nuisance under common
law."5 Today, most intrusion cases focus on subterfuge or outrageous
behavior by journalists or media persons. Moreover, when intrusion
involves the mass media, it is distinctively different from the other
three invasion of privacy torts because it occurs in the actual
newsgathering process, and not in a subsequent publication or broadcast of the offensive information. Consequently, intrusion requires no
publicity for a valid cause of action.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 248.
Id.
Id. at 252-53.
167 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
Id. at 69.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 71.
Id.

supra note 4, § 652B.
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45 (1967) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 1570 (Rees Welsh & Co. 1902)).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
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For example, in Dietemann v. Time, Inc. ,46 a magazine reporter pretended to be the plaintiff's patient in order to gain access to the plaintiff's home.47 After deceitfully obtaining entry, the journalist secretly
tape recorded and photographed the plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held the journalist's behavior constituted invasion of
privacy.48 Although the plaintiff invited the reporter into his house,
the court reasoned that a plaintiff "should not be required to take the
risk that what is heard and seen will be transmitted by photograph or
recording... .,4'Rejecting the defendant's claim that concealed electronic mechanisms are essential to investigative reporting, the court
strongly disagreed that such tools are indispensable for newsgathering:
"The First Amendment has never been construed to accord newsmen
immunity from torts or crimes committed during the course of
newsgathering. The First Amendment is not a license to trespass, to
steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the precincts of another's
home or office." 50
D. Public Disclosure of EmbarrassingPrivate Facts
The private-facts tort involves a publication that "(a) would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person and (b) is not of legitimate
concern to the public."5 " In Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co.,"2 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals defined the private-facts tort as publication
of information so intimate and so unwarranted as to shock or outrage
a community's notions of decency.53 However, the Sidis court failed
to define legitimatepublic concern, noting that public figures are "subjects of considerable interest and discussion to the rest of the
population."54
In Sidis, the plaintiff was a child prodigy. Regardless of the passage
of thirty years since the plaintiff's childhood, the court found he was a
figure of legitimate public interest and publishing information about
him did not offend a community's notions of decency." As the court
observed, "he was a person about whom the newspapers might display
46. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
47. Id. at 246.
48. Id. at 247.
49. Id. at 249.
50. Id. See also Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). An overzealous
photographer trailed Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis for days, bumping into Onassis and

her daughter, following her vehicle too closely while driving, and endangering her
children. Although most of defendant's activity occurred in a public place, the court
held the degree and nature of his fact collecting process constituted not only invasion
of privacy, but also assault, battery, harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 994.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 652D.
52. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
53. Id. at 809.

54. Id.
55. Id.
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a legitimate intellectual interest, in the sense meant by Warren and
Brandeis, as distinguished from a trivial and unseemly curiosity."56
In another private-facts case, Barber v. Time, Inc. 57 a plaintiff recovered damages for a picture taken against her will while she was in
the hospital.58 In Barber, a picture was published alongside a story
revealing that the plaintiff suffered from a rare disease causing her to
lose weight even though she ate in excess. The article referred to the
plaintiff as a "starving glutton."59 The Missouri Supreme Court found
the publication was an invasion of medical privacy which violates the
legally protected confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship. 60 The Barber court held an individual has a right to privacy regarding medical treatment and a right to be free from personal
publicity.61 Moreover, the court noted the legitimate public concern
element of the private-facts tort only permits identification of the
plaintiff if the press needs to warn the public that the plaintiff carries a
contagious disease.62 Therefore, identification of the Barber plaintiff
was unnecessary because a story concerning a legitimate public concern would have focused on the rare disease rather than the patient.
Private-facts torts often conflict with freedom of expression under
the First Amendment. Consequently, courts must balance competing
rights. When First Amendment claims are weak or nonexistent, the
law must be applied narrowly to protect personal secrets or private
moments that are neither newsworthy nor of legitimate public concern. Professor Zelezny posits that "the perceived threat of mortifying exposure by the mass media is probably as great today as it was in
1890 when Warren and Brandeis published their influential law review
article." 63 Nevertheless, "only a few courts have ruled against the media and other corporations in private-facts cases."' 64 Thus, Professor
Middleton asserts, "Plaintiffs in private-facts suits are most likely to
be successful when the information made public about them involves
illness, hospitalization, retardation or exposure of intimate parts of the
body. Because offensiveness is a jury question, what constitutes 65a
highly offensive revelation may vary with communities and regions.

56. Id.
57. 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942).

58. Id. at 292, 296.
59. Id. at 295.
60. Id.
61. Id.

62. Id.
63. ZELEZNY, supra note 1, at 168.
64. MIDDLETON &
65. Id.

CHAMBERLIN,

supra note 25, at 182.
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E. Defenses to Invasion of Privacy
1. Intrusion, Commercial Appropriation, and False-Light Defenses
There are several defenses to invasion of privacy torts as a matter of
law. Consent and occurrence of an event in a public place are both
defenses to intrusion lawsuits.6 6 Consent is also the most often asserted defense in commercial appropriation cases.6 7

Additionally,

newsworthiness may be asserted as a defense to commercial appropriation if names or pictures are published by the news media. 68 Furthermore, courts have held profit69motivation or advertising support does
not diminish newsworthiness.
Defendants in false-light lawsuits use newsworthiness to defeat the
highly offensive element required in false-light causes of action. Defendants also use truth or ignorance of the falsity to defeat the reckless
disregard or knowledge of the falsity element. This knowledge requirement stems from the United States Supreme Court's extension7°of
constitutional privilege to false-light lawsuits in Time, Inc. v. Hill.
In Hill, the Supreme Court compared the standard for false-light
torts to the standard for libel set forth in New York Times v. Sullivan.71 Under Sullivan, a libel plaintiff must prove a defendant had
knowledge of the falsity or displayed reckless disregard for the truth.7"
Noting that the same First Amendment principles relevant in Sullivan
apply to false-light cases, the Hill Court held false-light plaintiffs are
subject to the same burden of proof as libel plaintiffs.73 Thus, in falselight cases involving matters of legitimate public concern, if a plaintiff
is a public figure, he must prove the defendant had knowledge of the
falsity or displayed a reckless disregard for the truth.74
2. Private-Facts Defenses
There are three defenses to private-facts torts recognized by law: (1)
consent; (2) matters of legitimate public concern (often referred to as
newsworthiness); and (3) constitutional privilege (public records or occurrences). Consent will not be discussed because it is primarily a fact
issue.75 The legitimate public concern defense is often the focus in
cases involving publication of matters not accessible to the general
66. See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd.,
895 P.2d 1269 (Nev. 1995).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584-85 (N.Y.
1984).
70. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
71. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
72. Id. at 283.
73. Hill, 385 U.S. at 390-91.
74. Id.
75. See generally W. PAGE PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 18, at 112 (5th ed. 1984).
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public. The mass media generally relies on the legitimacy of public
concern defense when consent and constitutional privilege are not
available.76
The constitutional privilege77 defense extends from the principle
that information cannot be private in nature when legally obtained
from public records. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,78 a father
sued an Atlanta television station for reporting his daughter's name in
violation of a Georgia statute prohibiting publication or broadcast of a
rape victim's identity.79 The United States Supreme Court, however,
held the First Amendment does not permit a privacy suit against the
media for disseminating private information contained in public
records that are part of an open-court proceeding.8" Justice White
wrote:
By placing the information in the public domain on official court
records, the state must be presumed to have concluded that the
public interest was thereby being served .... We are reluctant to
embark on a course that would make public records generally available to the media but forbid their publication if offensive to the sensibilities of the supposed reasonable man. Such a rule would make
citizens about the public
it very difficult for the media to inform
business and yet stay within the law. 81
In 1989, the Supreme Court further expanded its public-records
protection in Florida Star v. B.J.F.82 In Florida Star, a newspaper
named a rape victim in a one-paragraph news story.83 The newspaper
acquired the information from a police news release, despite signs in
the police department press relations center which warned that a rape
victim's name is not part of the public record.' Moreover, a Florida
statute made it unlawful to publish a rape victim's name. 85 Additionally, the newspaper had its own policy prohibiting such publication.86
The United States Supreme Court, however, held for the newspaper, reasoning that if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance, "punishment may lawfully
76. See Barber v. Tune, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942) (illustrating the subjectivity in determining newsworthiness in cases not within a narrow range); MIDDLETON &
CHAMBERLIN, supra note 25, at 182. Middleton and Chamberlin note a jury determination of newsworthiness or matter of legitimate public concern may vary greatly
from one community or region of the country to another. Id.
77. The constitutional privilege defense is also referred to as the public records
defense.
78. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
79. Id. at 495.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 495-96.
82. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
83. Id. at 527.
84. Id. at 528.
85. Id. at 526.
86. Id. at 528.
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be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of
the highest order."87 Justice Marshall expressed his belief that the
government erroneously disclosed the plaintiff's name by including it
in police records.88 He further stated the government violated its own
policy by disseminating a government news release, and this "can
hardly be said to be a narrowly tailored means of safeguarding
anonymity."89
The Cox and FloridaStar cases appear to limit the private-facts tort
to non-newsworthy disclosures. Notably, in neither decision does the
Supreme Court prohibit the government from sealing court documents or prohibit courts from protecting identities by using fictitious
names. Both Cox and Florida Star contain narrow holdings to protect
the use of lawfully obtained public records. Thus, these rules assume
public records are of concern to the community or are newsworthy by
nature.90
II.

INVASION OF PRIVACY IN TEXAS

A.

General

Texas did not recognize invasion of privacy until 1973 in Billings v.
Atkinson. 91 Billings was an intrusion case involving wiretapping.92 In
June 1967, Mrs. Lloyd Billings was speaking with a neighbor on the
telephone when she noticed a loud popping noise on the phone line.9 3
She terminated the call and walked outside, where she noticed Atkinson, a telephone repairman, working on the terminal box behind her
house. When a second telephone repairman returned the next day to
investigate the source of the popping noise, he discovered a wire tap
device attached to the petitioner's phone line which would transmit
conversations over a standard FM radio when connected to the telephone line. The Billings sued, claiming mental anguish as a result of
the wire tap.94
The trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the
defendant. The court of appeals affirmed, relying on Milner v. Red
River Publishing Co.,95 holding no right of privacy exists at common
87. Id. at 541.
88. Id. at 538.
89. Id.
90. MIDDLETON & CHAMBERLIN, supra note 25, at 189.

91. 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 859.
94. Id.
95. 249 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1952, no writ). In Milner, a widow of
a World War II veteran sued for invasion of privacy after the Sherman Daily Democrat published an obituary which mentioned Milner's involvement in several thefts.
Id. at 227. The court held for the defendant, noting the plaintiff's complaint failed to
state a cause of action because Texas did not recognize the right to privacy. Id. at 229.
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law, nor does any right to privacy exist by statute.96 The Texas
Supreme Court reversed, however, noting Milner recognized that
some privacy interests are afforded protection under other theories of
law. 97 Persuaded by the Restatement (First) of Torts, the Billings
court was first to recognize that an
unwarranted invasion of an indi98
vidual's right of privacy-is a tort.
In 1975, the first Texas case involving commercial appropriation was
litigated. In Kimbrough v. Coca-Cola/USA,99 a former college football player sued for use of his name and likeness in advertisements in
college football game programs. The defendant contacted Kimbrough, inviting him to appear in a series of institutional advertisements for various universities in the Southwest Conference. 100
Kimbrough accepted the invitation and subsequently learned the defendant used his likeness in a commercial endorsement for a major
soft drink. Kimbrough testified that he "did not contemplate the use
of his name and picture in an advertisement which had the commercial aspects of the one published and had not consented to such
use." 10 1 The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant,
but the court of appeals reversed, holding a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to the extent of Kimbrough's consent.10 2 The Texas
Supreme Court refused writ and has yet to hear a commercial appropriation lawsuit.
In 1976, the Texas Supreme Court recognized a private-facts tort in
Industrial Foundation of the South v. Texas Industrial Accident
Board.103 In Industrial,the plaintiff was a nonprofit corporation collecting information relating to worker's compensation claims for distribution to its member employers. The plaintiff sued the defendant
seeking disclosure under the Texas Open Records Act. The defendant
claimed an exception, arguing compliance with the Texas Open
Records Act invades individual privacy by publicly disclosing embarrassing private facts. The Texas Supreme Court, however, remanded
the case for determination on a person-by-person basis as to whether
the information in the worker's compensation claims files could be
released under the Texas Open Records Act. 0 4 The court held:
96. Billings v. Atkinson, 471 S.W.2d 908, 912-13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1971) rev'd, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973).
97. Billings, 489 S.W.2d at 860 ("[Tlhe right of privacy interests have been afforded protection under such traditional theories as libel and slander, wrongful search
and seizure, eavesdropping and wiretapping ... .
98. Id.
99. 521 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); cf Benavidez v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying Texas law).
100. Kimbrough, 521 S.W.2d at 720.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 720, 724.
103. 540 S.W.2d 668, 682 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).
104. Id. at 686.
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[Information contained in workmen's compensation claim files is
excepted from mandatory disclosure under Section 3(a)(1) as information deemed confidential by law if (1) the information contains
highly intimate or embarrassing facts the publication of which
would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) the
information is not of legitimate concern to the public. If the information meets the first test, it will be presumed that the information
is not of legitimate public concern unless the requestor can show
that, under the particular circumstances of the case, the public has a
legitimate
interest in the information notwithstanding its private
10 5

nature.

In 1994, in Cain v. Hearst Corp.,10 6 the Texas Supreme Court refused to recognize false-light. In Cain, the plaintiff was a prison inmate serving a life sentence for murder. He sued for false-light
invasion because a newspaper published false information claiming he
was a member of the "Dixie Mafia" and he had killed as many as eight
people. 10 7 The Cain majority rejected false-light because "1) it largely
duplicates other rights of recovery, particularly defamation; and 2) it
lacks many of the procedural limitations that accompany actions for
defamation, thus unacceptably increasing the tension that already exists between free speech constitutional guarantees and tort law."' 1 8
In his dissent, Justice Hightower, joined by three other justices, argued defamation and false-light are not co-extensive. 10 9 Justice
Hightower maintained the scope of actionable conduct varies between
the torts and each tort is calculated to protect distinctively different
interests. 110 This close decision and Justice Hightower's strong dissent
suggest Texas might recognize false-light in the future.
In summary, Texas presently recognizes a cause of action for intrusion and for public disclosure of embarrassing private facts. Texas
courts have implicitly acknowledged commercial appropriation, but
have rejected false-light.
105. Id. at 685.
106. 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994).
107. Id. at 577. The newspaper article also stated:
Cain killed one of his lawyers in 1973 and married the lawyer's widow a few
months later; Cain killed a 67 year old [sic] man in 1977; in 1983 he "bought"
a prostitute from a friend to help finance his activities; Cain persuaded the
prostitute to marry a trailer park owner named Anderson, so that Cain could
kill Anderson and share in the prostitute's inheritance from Anderson; when
the prostitute balked, Cain threatened to kill her 5 year old [sic] daughter
and "deliver her daughter's head in a wastepaper basket;" the prostitute
married Anderson 3 days later; and on January 5, 1985 Cain killed
Anderson.
Id. Not surprisingly, Cain did not mention these allegations in his false-light claim.
Id.
108. Id. at 579-80.

109. Id. at 586 (Hightower, J., dissenting).
110. Id. (Hightower, J., dissenting).
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B. EmbarrassingPrivate-Facts Tort in Texas
Because Texas courts have only recently recognized the privatefacts tort, there are few Texas cases regarding private-facts disclosure
by the mass media. In McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc.,"' the
Brownsville Herald published a photograph of McNamara, a student,
playing in a high school soccer match. The photograph accompanied a
story regarding the contest. The photograph showed
the plaintiff run1
ning after a soccer ball with his genitals exposed. 2
As a defense, the newspaper contended the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution and the free speech provision of the
Texas Constitution" 3 barred recovery because the photograph was
newsworthy and was taken in a public place. The Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals held the newspaper was immune to liability for publication of the photograph, noting "the First Amendment sometimes
protects what would otherwise be an actionable invasion of privacy
when a publication by the media is involved."" 4
Moreover, asserting First Amendment protection encompasses "a
vast spectrum of tastes, views, and expressions, all of which fall within
a broad definition of newsworthy," ' 1 5 the McNamara court stated
"[a]rguably the rights of free speech and press guaranteed by our
Texas Constitution are more extensive than those guaranteed by the
United States Constitution.""' 6 The court found it significant that
McNamara was voluntarily participating in a spectator sport in a public place, and no one involved in the publishing
process noticed the
11 7
photograph.
the
in
exposure
embarrassing
In another related case involving the mass media, Star-Telegram,
Inc. v. Walker," 8 a trial judge issued a protective order prohibiting the
newspaper from publishing information already disclosed in open
court and in the public record." 9 The Texas Supreme Court, however,
held the protective order violated Article I, Section 8 of the Texas
Constitution because it unreasonably restricted
expression by prevent20
ing the dissemination of public information.1
In Star Telegram, the protective order was intended to protect the
identity of a victim of a brutal rape. The victim reported the crime to
111. 802 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
112. Id. at 903.
113. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8.
114. McNamara, 802 S.W.2d at 904 (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 905. Cf.Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So.2d 474 (Ala. 1964)
(holding a published photograph was an invasion of privacy where a woman's dress
blew over her head and exposed her panties and legs at a county fair exhibit).
118. Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Walker, 834 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. 1992).
119. Id. at 55.
120. Id.
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the police who prepared an offense report containing the victim's
identity."' 1 Based on the police report, the newspaper published two
news stories, but did not use the victim's name. However, a week
after the first story appeared, the victim filed a request to compel use
of the pseudonym "Jane Doe" in all public files and records concerning the offense.122 Despite her request for anonymity, Jane Doe's real
name was used in an indictment filed in October 1989.123
In June 1990, Jane Doe sued the newspaper for private-facts invasion of privacy, claiming the newspaper used sufficient detail in the
news stories to identify her. During discovery in the civil suit, the defendant asked Jane Doe for information relating to her identity. She
responded by filing for a protective order in December 1990.124 The
order was orally granted during a telephone hearing, prohibiting the
Star-Telegram from publishing facts relating to the victim's identity. 125
Approximately two months later, the prosecuting attorney in the
criminal case advised Jane Doe that using her real name during the
criminal trial would increase the probability of the rapist's conviction.
Jane Doe agreed, provided the court record would be sealed following
the criminal trial. The assailant was convicted and Jane Doe's real
name was used on numerous occasions during the criminal trial.'2 6
In June 1991, the state sealed the files and expunged Jane Doe's real
name from the records of the criminal trial. 127 Meanwhile, the StarTelegram moved for reconsideration of the oral protective order
granted in December 1990.128 On reconsideration, the trial judge reduced the order to writing after Jane Doe submitted proof of the
state's promise of confidentiality through evidence of the criminal
court order expunging her identity. 12 9 On appeal, the Texas Supreme
Court held the trial court's protective order constituted an invalid
prior restraint on the Star-Telegram's Article I, Section 8 right to disseminate public information, noting:
Trial proceedings are public information.... The order entered
by the criminal court closing the files and expunging Jane Doe's true
identity from the criminal records (more than three months following the criminal trial) could not retroactively abrogate the press'
[sic] right to publish public information properly obtained from
open records. The law cannot recall information once it is in the
public domain.' 30

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id. (citing TEx. CODE
Id.
Id. at 55-56.
Id.
Id. at 56.
Id.
Id.
Id.

CRIM. PROC. art.

57.02(f) (West 1992)).

130. Id. at 57 (footnote omitted).
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Moreover, in another related case, Doe v. Star-Telegram, Inc.,'

a

rape victim contended the Fort Worth Star-Telegram indirectly identified her by disclosing information from police reports including her
age, occupation, business address, and make and model of her automobile. 132 The defendant asserted several defenses, including newsworthiness and the constitutional privilege of lawfully obtained public
records. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant. 133 The court 1of
appeals reversed and remanded,134 and the de35
appealed.
fendant
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held two of the defendant's four
defenses were groundless. 36 First, pleading truth as a defense was
inapplicable in a private-facts tort action. 137 Second, the plaintiff had
withdrawn her negligence claim, so the newspaper's defense to that
cause of action was moot. 138 As to its other defenses, the newspaper
asserted (1) the information was truthful and lawfully obtained, and
(2) the matter was of legitimate public concern.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held the defendant's public
records defense under FloridaStar was negated by an allegation contained in a police sergeant's affidavit. 139 The police sergeant maintained the reporter violated police department policy and procedure.
The appellate court held the second defense would fail if the information was unlawfully obtained. Ultimately, the appellate court found a
factual dispute existed over whether the information was lawfully obtained and thus reversed the defendant's summary judgment.14 0
The Texas Supreme Court, moreover, rejected the newspaper's procedural argument, which claimed the summary judgment should be
reinstated because the respondent failed to assign error to each basis
on which the newspaper moved for summary judgment.' 4 1 The Doe
court reasoned, "In challenging a summary judgment, it is sufficient
that an appellant broadly assert the trial court erred in granting sum1 42
mary judgment. 1
Notwithstanding this finding, the Texas Supreme Court, however,
unanimously reversed the court of appeals. Under the specific facts of
the case, the court held the information disclosed by the newspaper
131.
341575
132.
133.
134.

864 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993), rev'd, No. D-4578, 1995 WL
(Tex. June 8, 1995).
Id. at 791.
Id. at 792.
Id. at 793.

135. Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, No. D-4578, 1995 WL 341575 (Tex. June 8, 1995)

(unpublished opinion).
136. Doe, 864 S.W.2d at 792.
137. Id.
138. Id.

139. Id. at 792-93.
140. Id. at 793.
141. Doe, 1995 WL 341575 at *2.
142. Id. (citing Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970)).
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concerned matters of legitimate public concern.1 43 Moreover, the Doe
court concluded this defense was sufficient to disprove an essential
element of
the plaintiff's case, and thus affirmed the summary
144
judgment.
The Doe court reasoned that facts which do not directly identify an
innocent party, but which may indirectly identify the party to persons
who are already aware of uniquely identifying personal information
may or may not be a legitimate public concern.14 5 Although the court
cautioned the news media to avoid unwarranted public disclosure and
embarrassment of individuals involved in otherwise newsworthy
events of legitimate public interest, the court noted it is impossible for
the news media to anticipate every such circumstance and avoid it
"without an unacceptable chilling effect on the media.... ,,
The
Texas Supreme Court stated:
To require the media to sort through an inventory of facts, to deliberate, and to catalogue each of them according to their individual
and cumulative impact under all circumstances, would impose an
impossible task; a task which foreseeably could cause critical information of legitimate public interest to be withheld
until it becomes
1 47
untimely and worthless to an informed public.
As a result, the court did not consider the petitioner's constitutional
claims or the constitutional issues addressed by the court of appeals
148
regarding whether the truthful information was lawfully obtained.
III.

THE FUTURE OF PRIVACY TORTS IN TEXAS

The Texas Supreme Court should adopt a broad interpretation of
the defenses available in private-facts lawsuits to avoid the potential
chilling effects on both mass media and other forms of public expression. As the McNamara court noted, the rights of free speech and free
press guaranteed under the Texas Constitution are more extensive
than those guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 149 McNamara correctly acknowledged a broad interpretation of newsworthy
was necessary when balancing First Amendment interests against an
individual's privacy
interests in protecting against disclosure of embar50
rassing facts.'
Professor Francois contends, "'[Liegitimate public interest' is crucial in the disposition of many libel and privacy lawsuits because a
143. Id. at *1.
144. Id. at *4.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
150. Id.
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publication that is in the public interest implicates the First Amendment."'' He further notes that "Wisconsin's right to privacy law, enacted in 1977, 'stipulates that any relief depends on1 whether
there is a
52
legitimate public interest in the matter involved."
The Texas Supreme Court's holding in Star-Telegram provides a
buffer against the potential chilling effects on news media that might
emanate from covering rape cases. However, Star-Telegram failed to
address the relevant constitutional issues. 53 Ultimately. the issue is

not identification of a plaintiff, but whether the information is lawfully
obtained and of legitimate public concern. The Star-Telegram court
held the information contained in police reports was of legitimate
public concern, but the court did not foreclose future challenges over
how information is obtained. The Texas Legislature should provide
disclosure exemptions for certain individuals, such as informants and
rape victims, thus their names would not be a matter of public record.
Logically, if the names are not in the public record, any argument regarding suppression of First Amendment rights is mooted.
The Texas Supreme Court should reexamine the test from Industrial
regarding all private-facts cases. In Industrial,the court held information that satisfies the requirement of containing highly intimate or embarrassing facts, the publication of which would be highly
objectionable to a reasonable person, also satisfies a presumption that
such information is not of legitimate public concern unless a defendant demonstrates such legitimacy. 54 However, this places the burden
of proof upon those asserting First Amendment interests, and is contradictory to the holding in McNamara.55
Since the Industrialcourt recognized the private-facts tort, it is conceivable the court intended its test to be narrowly applied only to
cases involving access to worker's compensation files. Because of this
ambiguity, the Industrialtest should either be clarified or rejected. A
broader definition of what constitutes a matter of legitimate public
concern should be adopted, without placing an explicit or implicit burden of proof on defendants in private-facts lawsuits. Texas need not

151.

WILLIAM

E.

FRANCOIS,

MASS MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION

236 (6th ed.

1994).
152. Id. (emphasis added).
153. Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, No. D-4578, 1995 WL 341575, at *3 (Tex. June 8,
1995).
154. Industrial Found. of the South v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668,
685 (Tex. 1976).
155. McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901, 904-05 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). See also FRANCOIS, supra note 151.
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follow the lead of other states in completely rejecting a private-facts
tort, 156 but it should make modifications to its existing laws.
Michael Sewell

156. See, e.g., Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988) (holding claims for invasion
of privacy for publication of true but private facts are not cognizable at law).
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